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Abstract 
This paper seeks to address how political risk influences behaviour, in 
particular rent seeking behaviour. Such risk is important in many 
industries, which posts challenges both for policy makers and 
economic agents. 
This paper studies how political uncertainty affects rent seeking, and 
what level of political uncertainty is “optimal” for society. We find 
that under some conditions, a higher level of political uncertainty 
might be beneficial to discourage rent seeking. On the other hand, 
high risk aversion among the agents decreases the optimal level of 
uncertainty, as risk averse agents suffer a higher loss in utility from a 
high uncertainty. It is possible to find several areas where this analysis 
is relevant. For instance, in fisheries, increasing uncertainty about 
whether or not to implement (or extend) a pay-back scheme will 
reduce the incentives for the fishermen to overinvest in vessels.  
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Introduction 
In an important early paper, Kydland and Prescott, 1977 analyzed the regulator’s best 
strategies, laying the foundations for a large branch of literature concluding that, to minimize 
negative side-effects, regulators should try to stick to objective rules, and limit their own 
possibilities to deviate from these rules in the future. The applications for this approach seem 
endless. Kydland and Prescott used patent policy as an example. Policy makers have 
incentives to promote research by offering patents (i.e., monopolist profit) to inventors, yet, 
once the invention is made, they have incentives to open for normal competition to maximize 
the social benefit from the invention. Other important applications have been central bank 
policy (e.g., Barro and Gordon, 1983) and environmental policy (e.g., Gersbach and Glazer, 
1999). 
 
These areas seem far from natural resource economics, yet we see similar problems where 
commitment to rules or objectives not necessarily solves the problem both in agriculture, 
fisheries, and aquaculture. A commonly debated problem today is CO2 emissions and quotas. 
Future quotas are bound to, one way or the other, be affected by current emissions. Hence, the 
regulations here create counter-productive incentives, i.e., to increase emissions before the 
quotas are introduced, in order to increase one’s own share of the quotas in the future (e.g., 
Brandt, 2002). 
   
Two other classical examples are from fisheries, where some future quotas for 
individuals/vessels are based on their past or current catches. To maximize future quotas, 
fishermen have incentives to maximize current catch, thus effectively reducing the future 
stock. Also, governments have introduced buy-back programs for vessels to reduce the 
overcapacity in some fisheries. If fishermen expect that such programs might be repeated, 
they have incentives to invest in capacity today, thus undermining the objective of the 
program. This mechanism is probably one of the reasons why such programs have been less 
successful than expected (Wenninger and McConnell, 2000; Clark et al., 2005). These 
situations, at least at first sight, provide reasons to question whether governments always 
should try to reduce risk – as this should seem to encourage rent seeking efforts. This is in a 
sense the main problem we will study in this paper.   
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In aquaculture, there seem to be expectations that the government will bail out large producers 
in case of a crisis due to overproduction and low prices. If this expectation is widespread, it 
will lead to decreased risk aversion, higher investment and increased probability of a crisis. 
This is the same known moral hazard problem as we have seen in banking in recent years – 
confidence that government in the end will bail out large players gives these incentives to take 
on more risk, thus increasing the risk of a crisis.  
 
In agriculture, one could argue that some of the same problems exist. In many countries, the 
industry is characterized by overproduction and (decreasing) subsidies, and to improve their 
bargaining position, farmers could have incentives to over-invest or otherwise act against the 
objectives of the policy maker. Again, we get the impression that rent seeking becomes easier 
and more profitable when the industry agents have high confidence about the government’s 
future actions. Many of these examples are just anecdotal evidence to motivate the study of a 
link between political uncertainty and rent seeking. Nevertheless, they still suggest that the 
costs from rent seeking can be defined more broadly, such that it includes all costs to society 
arising from “sub-optimal” regulation, where the non-optimality is caused by interference of 
potential stakeholders in the process of determining regulation.     
 
From the literature we know that regulatory interference (and expectations thereof) can have 
negative side-effects, both for individuals and for society at large, which consequently has led 
to the result that regulators should follow certain rules of thumb (as outlined by 
Kydland/Prescott) to reduce these side-effects. The recommendation of Kydland/Prescott 
implicitly implies to reduce political induced uncertainty to a minimum. However, compared 
to the above results, this paper shows that political uncertainty, under certain conditions, can 
have a welfare increasing effect, since it reduces wasteful rent seeking effort. If increasing 
political uncertainty reduces costs to society from reducing rent seeking effort more than it 
increases costs to society from larger political uncertainty, then a positive level of political 
risk is desirable.  
 
To understand this result, we have to look at rent seeking. Rent seeking is a common problem 
in most situations with regulation and regulatory risk. Rent seeking could be defined as 
actions with the purpose of influencing or taking advantage of regulatory decisions - actions 
that are both socially inefficient and would not be undertaken without the possibilities of 
gaining from the regulations. These gains could come in the form of granted monopoly 
4 
 
power, quotas or other benefits, or in the form of political decisions considered helpful for the 
rent-seeker.  
 
In food production, it is easy to think of various kinds of rent seeking behaviour. In fisheries, 
the main issue is quotas. Rent seeking behaviour could be undertaken to increase one’s own 
quota, both compared to other competing fishermen, other vessel types, quotas of other 
species, and compared to quotas in other countries. In aquaculture, rent seeking behaviour 
could be used for obtaining production licenses at good locations, or in the fight for 
favourable trade agreements. In many countries, agriculture is particularly prone to rent 
seeking behaviour, as a very large share of farmers’ income are various forms of direct 
subsidies, grants and transfers from the government. 
 
The theoretical literature on the economics of rent seeking is large and growing - see e.g. 
Lockard and Tullock, 2001 for a review. One of the fundamental results is that firms will 
undertake rent seeking behaviour/lobbyism to maximize their expected utility. That is, they 
will spend resources on rent seeking behaviour as long as the expected utility of the 
investment is positive. 
  
Tullock, 1967 and Posner, 1975 point out that becoming a monopolist is a competitive 
activity and hence the expected profit from obtaining the monopoly is zero. The mechanism is 
that each firm invests in rent seeking to the point where the last dollar spent equals the 
improved probability of obtaining the rent. The idea is that in order to obtain or maintain a 
monopoly (defend its position), it is necessary to engage in rent seeking expenditures. Total 
rent dissipation occurs when competition for rents is perfectly competitive. (In the words of 
Hillman, 2003: ”With complete dissipation, we can measure the social cost of rent seeking by 
the value of the rent that was the price in the rent seeking contest.” ). Other analysis suggests 
that the level of rent dissipation depends on types of assumptions. For our purpose, Boyce, 
1998 provides an analysis of rent seeking for a number of natural resources, concluding that a 
rent-seeking model might be chosen over an open-access model because full rent dissipation 
will be more difficult. 
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Less work is done on the risk1 carried by the regulated firms and industries. Regulations and 
expected regulations might lead to changed decisions, but usually, one does not know whether 
or how the regulations will change in the future.  On the one hand, this risk implies a cost for 
businesses. First, obviously, compared to the situation with certainty, they will make 
wrong/unprofitable decisions on a certain percentage of all occasions. Also, the presence of 
risk implies a direct loss of utility, as decision makers must be assumed to be risk averse. 
Some studies (e.g., Flaten et al., 2005 and Bergfjord, 2006) indicate that such regulatory risk 
is important for producers.  
 
As the review above suggests, both rent-seeking and political uncertainty have large potential 
consequences. One could arguable that political uncertainty is a necessary condition for rent-
seeking, and hence that too much political uncertainty leads to undesirable rent seeking. On 
the other hand, we will argue that total political certainty might not be optimal either. This 
could also increase rent-seeking, thus implying some kind of trade-off between political 
uncertainty and rent-seeking. Hence, it is interesting to study how this link works, and more 
normatively, what can be done to improve the regulations. These are the topics for the rest of 
this paper. 
 
Some work is done in this area before. Most directly related to our problem are the papers of 
Hillman and Katz, 1984; van Long and Vousten, 1987; Konrad and Schlesinger, 1997; Cornes 
and Hartley, 2008; Yamazaki, 2009; and Treich, 2009, which all analyse various types of rent 
seeking games with risk averse agents. Their general result, with different generality and 
under different assumptions, is that risk and risk aversion typically decreases rent seeking 
efforts. Among related literature, Murphy et al., 1993 find that rent seeking has a negative 
effect on growth and investment, whereas Brunetti and Weber, 1998 and references therein 
conclude that political uncertainty has a negative effect on investment. Skaperdas and Gan, 
1995 study how risk-aversion affects the different agents’ chance of winning a rent seeking 
contest, and find that under limited liability; the more risk averse agent will always have a 
higher chance of winning. Otherwise, risk-aversion will have no or ambiguous effects on the 
chance of winning. Finally, Bramoulle and Treich, 2004 study how uncertainty influences 
welfare and behaviour in the game of global pollution, and get the result that emissions will 
                                                 
1 In a Knightian sense (Knight, 1921), some of the issues we are discussing are primarily ”risky”, whereas others 
are primarily ”uncertian”. However, as the distinction between the two seems to be vague (if existent at all) in 
modern literature, we do not differentiate between these terms. 
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be lower with high uncertainty due to risk aversion and that uncertainty can in fact have a 
positive impact on the welfare of the risk averse polluters. 
   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model, while 
section 3 introduces political risks. Section 4 presents the main result that under certain 
condition a positive level of political risk is optimal, while section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
Model  
 
Assume n identical rent seekers who are equipped with the following utility function, which 
measures the expected utility for an individual from engaging in rent seeking activity: 
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )i i i i i i i i i i iU p x u R I x p x u I x= ⋅ + − + − ⋅ −  
 
where iI  is the initial wealth of rent seeker i , ip  is the probability of “winning” for rent 
seeker i , i.e., that the rent seeking effort proves successful, R is the “prize” for successful rent 
seeking, and x  is the rent seeking cost. All rent seekers solve the program:  
ix
max ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )i i i i i i i i i i iU p x u R I x p x u I x= ⋅ + − + − ⋅ −  
 
This approach makes it very complicated to derive the analytical result we are looking for.  
We assume a simplification of this utility function given by  
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )i i i i i i i i i iU p x u R I p x u I x= ⋅ + + − ⋅ −  
 
That is, we let the utility function be quasi linear in ix . Given this, we do not take into 
consideration how changes in ix  affects marginal utility, which is to say that we neglect the 
income effect coming from changes in ix . Rather, we focus on the effect on the probability of 
winning from a change in ix . This approach can be justified by assuming that ix  is (very) 
small compared to total welfare of the agents, which is usually the case. 
 
Taking the other rent seekers’ investments as given, this gives the following first order 
condition for optimal rent seeking behaviour of rent seeker i: 
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( ) [ ( ) ( )] 1 0i i i i i i
i i
U p x u R I u I
x x
∂ ∂
= ⋅ + − − =
∂ ∂
 
 
We apply a commonly used contest success function (CSF), first used by Tullock (1980). A 
Contest Success Function (CSF) provides each player's probability of winning as a function of 
all players' rent seeking effort, such that increased effort of one agent enhance its probability 
of winning. We here assume the following a linear technology: 
i
i n
i j ì j
xp
x x≠
=
+∑     
     
Where n is the number of rent seekers. Due to the symmetry, we get the following expression 
(suppressing the subscripts for convenience): 
2
1 1p n
x x n
∂ −
= ⋅
∂
.  
Substitute this into the above expression for /i iU x∂ ∂ and solving for the optimal level of rent 
seeking yields:  
*
2
1 [ ( ) ( )]nx u R I u I
n
−
= ⋅ − −                                                                                 [1] 
Hence, without any uncertainty about the size of the price, we get the following expression for 
the optimal level of rent seeking:2 
* 2
4
2 ( 1)( ) [ ( ) ( )] 0x n n n u R I u I
n n
∂ − −
= ⋅ − − <
∂
for 2n > . 
 
Introducing risk 
 
It is showed by Hillman and Katz, 1984 and Konrad and Schlesinger, 2000 that risk aversion 
always leads to lower investment in rent seeking. The latter paper makes a distinction between 
rent seeking, where the investment affects the chance of winning; and rent augmenting, where 
the investment increases the potential price, and where the picture is more ambiguous. We, 
however, will focus on the first case, where the investment increases the chance to win. 
  
                                                 
2 When talking about no risk here, we refer to a situation where no uncertainty about the size of the price from 
winning the contest exists. For the individual rent seeker, it still remains uncertain whether or not he/she wins the 
price, as described by the contest function.  
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With risk averse agents the result is that higher risk aversion (or, as in our case, higher 
political uncertainty), leads to less rent seeking. However, the higher risk (and/or risk 
aversion) also leads to less utility derived from any particular situation.  
 
Hillman and Katz, 1984, made an early contribution to the literature on risk and rent seeking, 
and Long and Vousten, 1987 used their result to model the effect of uncertainty on rent 
seeking under certain realistic assumptions. The first assumption is that the rent to be 
achieved is relatively small compared to other wealth among the agents. While it is easy to 
imagine situations where this is not the case, in most cases, the rents related to any one 
particular investment are relatively small, as larger rent seeking scenarios often an be 
deconstructed into several smaller problems. The second assumption is that the number of 
potential rent seekers should be large. This is reasonable in most situations. Finally, the third 
assumption is that the prize has a fixed size, but that there is uncertainty about the share each 
rent seeker will receive. Given this, a smaller share of the rents are dissipated, and rent 
seeking decreases in risk aversion and variance, indicating that variance should be kept high 
to reduce social waste, as briefly mentioned by Long and Vousden. However, this ignores the 
effect on rent seekers. 
 
To find the “optimal” level of political uncertainty, we would hence have to ask ourselves: 
 
1) Should all rent seeking efforts be considered waste, or only a percentage of them? We 
do not study this in detail, but it seems clear that the damage to society from $1 of rent 
seeking investments might differ between different situations. 
2) For what level of variance σ in the prize R  will the benefits (smaller loss to society) 
be equal to the loss to rent seekers in terms of lost utility? 
 
To study these questions further, we build on the general model from the previous chapter, 
and introduce political uncertainty to the model. It is assumed that the political uncertainty 
affects the prize ( R ). For this, assume that R  is uniformly distributed over the range 
[ , ]L HR R , such that [ ] ( ) / 2L HE R R R= + .    
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Now introduce a political uncertainty parameter 0≥PUI  where 0=PUI  implies no 
uncertainty and the political risk is increasing in PUI .
3  
Consider the situation where: 
[ ] 0
PU
E R
I
∂
=
∂
, 0
L
PU
R
I
∂
<
∂
, 0
H
PU
R
I
∂
>
∂
 and 
2 2
2 2( ) ( )
H L
PU PU
R R
I I
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
 ,  
                   
that is, a change in the political risk does not change the expected value of prize, but changes 
the variance.4 The utility function in the presence of uncertainty is now:  
( ) [ ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )] (1 ) ( )L L H Hi i PU i PU i i i iu p x p u R I I p u R I I p u I x= ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ + − − −  
 
It follows that the optimal rent seeking as derived in equation 1 can be re-written as:  
[12
*
⋅
−
=
n
nx ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )] (1 ) ( )L L H Hi PU i i PU i i ip u R I I p u R I I p u I⋅ + + ⋅ + − −  
and 
][12
*
PU
H
H
iH
PU
L
L
iL
PU I
R
R
up
I
R
R
up
n
n
I
x
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
⋅+
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
⋅⋅
−
=
∂
∂  
 Note that it must be that ( ) 0i
PU
p x
I
∂
=
∂
 because n is unchanged, and the relative contribution of 
the contenders also is unchanged.  
 
It follows that, by using the assumption that 
L H
PU PU
R R
I I
∂ ∂
− =
∂ ∂
:  
*
{ } { }L Hi iH L
PU
u uxsign sign p p
I R R
∂ ∂∂
= ⋅ − ⋅
∂ ∂ ∂
. 
Finally, given the assumption about the uncertainty: 
2 22 * 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
1 [ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
1             [ ].
L L H H
L L H Hi i i i
L L H H
PU pu pu pu pu pu pu
L H
L Hi i
L H
pu pu pu pu
u u u ux n R R R Rp p p p
I n R I R I I R I R I I
u un R Rp p
n R I I R I I
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂− ∂ ∂
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Since 
                                                 
3 See paper of Brunetti and Weder (2002), where different types of uncertainties are described. 
4 It follows that 2 2
{ , }
1( ) ( )
2
i L H
i
R R R
R R Rσ
=
= −∑ , such that 2 0
PUI
σ∂
>
∂
. 
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2 2
2 2 0( ) ( )
L H
L Hi i
L H
pu pu
u uR Rp p
R I R I
∂ ∂∂ ∂
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
. 
 
It follows that  
 
2 *
2 0( )PU
x
I
>
<
∂
∂
, depending on the size of LP  and HP  (Note that for L HP P= , 
2 *
2 0( )PU
x
I
∂
<
∂
). 
 
There are now two types of costs that the regulator has to consider when choosing the optimal 
level of political uncertainty. We use some standard results from microeconomics that the risk 
premium is positive if the agent is risk averse, and increasing the more risky the lottery is. The 
behavior of the regulator is assumed to minimize the total costs coming from rent seeking, 
*( )PUn x I⋅ ,  and the cost associated with risk averse agent action under uncertainty, measured 
by the total risk premium, ( )PUn I⋅Π  such that the costs that the regulator minimizes are 
given by: 
*( ) ( ) ( )PU PU PUC I n x I n I= ⋅ + ⋅Π , 
First order conditions for optimal choice political uncertainty:  
*( ) ( ) ( ) 0PU PU PU
PU PU PU
C I x I In n
I I I
∂ ∂ ∂Π
= ⋅ + ⋅ =
∂ ∂ ∂
 
 
Given the way political risk has been defined, it follows that:  
( ) 0PU
PU
I
I
∂Π
>
∂
, and 
2
2
( ) 0
( )
PU
PU
I
I
∂ Π
>
∂
. Moreover, as already derived, 
2
2 0( )PU
x
I
∂
=
∂
. 
With 0≥PUI as defined above, it follows that the condition for interior optimum is given by:  
2
2
( ) 0
( )
PU
pu
C I
I
∂
>
∂
 and ( ) 0
( )
PU
PU
C I
I
∂
=
∂
 for PUI +∈  . 
 
For the following, it is convenient to be more precise about the range of the political 
uncertainty parameter, PUI . There might be several reasons why policy makers cannot freely 
change PUI , or there might be bounds on PUI (see also discussion below). To catch this, let 
[ ( ); ( )]PUPUPUI I z I z∈ , where z is a vector of exogenous restrictions (conditions that restrict) 
on the range of the political uncertainty.  
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Because *( )PUx I  is linear in PUI , while ( )PUIΠ  is convex and increasing in PUI , it is 
possible to identify a number of case to describe the optimal choice of PUI .  
 
1) It is optimal to choose * 0PUI >  following the rule 
*( ) 0PU
PU
C I
I
∂
=
∂
, if 
*
0 0
( )
PU PU
PU
PU PUI I
x I
I I
= =
∂ ∂Π
>
∂ ∂
 for * [ ( ); ( )]PUPUPUI I z I z∈ . 
 
 
2) It is optimal to choose ' 0PUI >  where 
' arg min ( )PU PUI C I=  s.t. [ ( ); ( )]PUPUPUI I z I z∈  if 
*
0 0
( )
PU PU
PU
PU PUI I
x I
I I
= =
∂ ∂Π
>
∂ ∂
 but * [ ( ); ( )]PUPUPUI I z I z∉ .  
3) It is optimal to choose 0PUI = , if 
*
0 0
( )
PU PU
PU
PU PUI I
x I
I I
= =
∂ ∂Π≤
∂ ∂
. 
 
We can identify three cases. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing risk increases 
welfare. The first case, however, shows under what conditions an increase in the political risk 
increases welfare, when taking into consideration that increases in political risk reduces other 
types of distortions, in this case distortions from wasteful rent seeking activity. Such a case is 
shown in figure 1.  
 
Fig 1: Choosing the level of political uncertainty puI  that minimizes the total costs C( puI ).
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we focus on situations where the first condition holds, this gives us the following 
comparative static result:  
 
                                                 
5 In the figure, it is assumed that 2 2( ) / ( ) 0PU PUx I I∂ ∂ =  . 
( )PUx I
( )PUIΠ
PUI  
( )PUC I
*( )PU
PU
x I
I∂
 *( )PU
PU
I
I
Π
∂
 
12 
 
1) The more rent seeking decreases with increased political risk, the more 
”beneficial” is political risk (all else equal) 
2) The more risk averse agents are, the more damaging is the political risk 
 
The reason for 1) is that when the gain from an increase in PUI  increases in terms of reduced 
rent seeking, then, all else being equal, it is optimal to provide more political risk. The reason 
for 2) is it that when the costs from increasing PUI  increase, it is optimal to provide less 
political risk. This could be e.g., due to an increase in the agents’ risk aversion, since higher 
risk aversion means larger 
PUI∂
Π∂  (for the same level of PUI ). 
 
In the second case, it is also optimal to increase the political uncertainty. Although it cannot 
be excluded theoretically, one obvious bound could be that ( ) 0L puR I ≥ , i.e., a negative prize 
should not be possible. The possible restrictions and interpretations of PUI  are discussed 
further in the next section. 
 
Finally, there are situations like the third case, where it is optimal to keep the political 
uncertainty as low as possible. This will happen in situations where the gain from increasing 
political uncertainty in terms of reduced rent seeking outlets cannot fully compensate for the 
higher loss in terms of increased risk premium, even for small levels of political uncertainty.  
 
 
 
Implications 
Having obtained these results, the next question is what implications they have, both for 
policy makers and agents. 
 
The variable to be controlled by policy makers here is PUI - the level of political risk. Ideally, 
this uncertainty level should be kept at an optimal level, given the gains and losses outlined 
above. Obviously, other factors will also influence the chosen level. In particular, one might 
think that the need for future flexibility always will push up the political uncertainty. It is not 
possible, nor desirable, for government to eliminate all political risk by stating that “No 
matter what happens in the future, we have set out this set of rules, and they will be kept like 
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this forever.” However, this can be taken into account when calibrating PUI , such that PUI = 0 
is interpreted as “minimum political uncertainty, given these constraints”. Also, changing the 
level of political uncertainty involves transaction costs. These are mainly ignored in our 
analysis, but it is clear that these could be substantial in real life, meaning that the optimal 
frequency and magnitude of such deliberate changes to the political uncertainty are likely to 
be relatively small. 
  
Given all this, it seems reasonable to assume that policy makers should try to set PUI  such 
that society’s costs from political risk are minimized6. In practice, a precise adjustment of PUI  
is of course impossible, but a reasonable rule of thumb is that efforts should be made to 
reduce uncertainty where PUI  is higher than optimal, whereas uncertainty could be introduced 
in various ways in situations where PUI  is too low. 
 
To view the political uncertainty as a control variable to be “manipulated” by the government 
and not a fixed parameter that ought to be as low as possible is a new approach compared to 
most of earlier literature. Our assumption that the level of uncertainty can be manipulated 
with great ease and precision is of course a simplification, but we argue that the government 
in fact should have considerable action space. If the present level of uncertainty is deemed to 
be too high, the government has several instruments available to decrease the risk. In some 
countries, a strengthened legal system might be necessary, including new laws limiting future 
government interference and more independent courts and judges. In other countries, all it 
takes to decrease the perceived political uncertainty can be rhetorical changes, for instance by 
emphasizing political and regulatory stability as important objectives. Other measures include 
different insurance schemes, longer term contracts and longer term budgeting. 
  
If the present level of uncertainty is deemed to be too low, some of the measures above could 
of course be reversed. Legislation could be changed to increase future flexibility; the 
rhetorical focus could be moved from stability to flexibility etc. In situations where the rent 
seeking efforts are likely to be pure loss to society, more uncertainty and less rent seeking is, 
ceteris paribus, likely to be beneficial to society. One example of this can be found in NILF, 
2006, which indicates that the total investment in Norwegian agriculture was at it lowest 
                                                 
6 Here, we assume that politicians act rationally on society’s behalf, and not rationally on their own personal or 
party’s behalf. 
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around the vote about a Norwegian membership in the European Union – a vote which result 
would have large implications for future policy in Norway. As these investments on average 
yield very low or negative returns, this political uncertainty is likely to be beneficial to society 
both through the reduced rent seeking and directly through reduced investment. If we 
continue with this example, farmers are on the other hand typically quite risk averse (Flaten et 
al., 2005). This implies that increased uncertainty will be relatively costly for them in terms of 
utility. This utility loss will thus to some extent outweigh the social benefits from the 
increased utility. 
  
If we study fishing and fish-farming, some of the “input variables” are different, yet the 
fundamental problem is the same. Fish-farmers and fishers seem to be considerably less risk 
averse than farmers (Bergfjord, 2006; Eggert and Martinsson, 2004). This implies that the 
social cost of high uncertainty is less in these industries, and that, ceteris paribus, the optimal 
level of political uncertainty is higher.  
 
Some of the political risk will be exogenous to the decision maker. This could for instance be 
the perception of legislation from EU, or new international treaties. In such cases, it might be 
optimal for the national decision maker to counteract this by regulation of other types of risks 
to reduce the overall cost of society from such exogenous chocks.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied the link between political risk and rent seeking behaviour. In a 
simple model, we show that under some conditions (low risk-aversion, high social costs of 
rent seeking) some political uncertainty is beneficial to society, as this reduces the agents’ 
optimal level of rent seeking efforts. Political uncertainty will, however, always impose a cost 
on (risk averse) agents by lowering their utility.  
  
We assume that governments to some extent can control the level of political uncertainty, 
either by committing to future actions or, more subtly, by always acting in accordance with 
the agents’ expectations. Even though it might be impossible to exactly calculate the optimal 
uncertainty level in every situation – and even more so to actually reach it – this means that 
governments should be aware of this trade-off. In situations where agents are risk averse, and 
rent seeking is uncommon and/or not very costly to society, governments should try to 
eliminate as much of the political uncertainty as possible. On the other hand, if rent seeking is 
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common and costly, and agents are more risk-tolerant, reducing the political uncertainty 
might in fact reduce the total social benefits. In terms of robustness, the main mechanism 
behind our argument is that the rent seekers will invest as long as the net benefit from doing 
so is positive. Given risk aversion, and when uncertainty is increased, then rent seeking 
investments will be reduced as net benefit is reduced. In this respect, our result is robust, since 
any mean-preserving, but risk enhancing situation, will imply a reduction in (wasteful) rent 
seeking investment. Konrad and Schlesinger (1997) find that rent aversion unambiguously 
reduces rent seeking expenditures in a competitive market, but this result is not necessarily 
robust when agents are acting strategic.  
 
At this stage, it is also worthwhile pointing out possible extensions and further research. 
While our model simply assumes that the political uncertainty affects the variance of the 
prize, it would be interesting to explore situations where the political uncertainty affected 
other variables, for instance the probabilities of winning, the number of contestants, the size 
of the prize, or some combination of these. Although the general trade-off between risk and 
rent seeking would remain the same, the models and specific results would provide additional 
insights about the robustness of our results in this paper. Additionally, using different 
assumptions and comparing the normative model results with actual behaviour, both from 
regulators and agents, could give new knowledge about how political uncertainty in reality 
affects rent seeking, i.e., which of our assumptions are closest to reality. 
 
Finally, it is clear that uncertainty in these situations in reality goes both ways. Governments 
impose uncertainty on (potential) rent seekers by their policy, but the uncertainty for rent 
seekers also introduces uncertainty for the government as to how common rent seeking will 
be, which in turn makes it more difficult for governments to implement optimal policies. We 
have only studied the uncertainty from government on rent seekers, an interesting extension 
could be to include.  
 
Our paper addresses both the issue of rent seeking and the direct cost to society from 
(political) risk. By properly manipulating the political risk, the overall cost to society from 
such risk is minimized. Ideally, since the decision maker addresses two distinct problems, a 
first best policy would involve using two distinct instruments, That is, if there would exist a 
policy that could be optimally tailored towards the rent seeking problem, then it logically 
follows that the political risk should be set to zero.  However, it is difficult to find such 
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instruments, for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult to restrain rent seeking without 
compromising the benefits from a free competitive market, and secondly, it is, as noted by 
e.g., Hillman, 2003, difficult directly to observe rent seeking activity.  
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that most of the situations where rent seeking is a problem, 
and where some positive level of political risk could be beneficial, are a result of underlying 
problems. This could either be “natural” causes for a market failure (for instance, well defined 
property rights to fish would solve some of these problems within fishery, yet such rights are 
difficult to establish). Other such problems are policy created, because other objectives have 
been considered more important than pure economic considerations. For instance, rent 
seeking in agriculture would be less common without subsidies, and less common in 
aquaculture if trade was free.  While Kydland and Prescott, 1977, stated that rules are better 
than discretion, one could hence say that our proposition is that discretion (uncertainty) in 
some cases might be better than bad rules. 
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